Coercive Distribution

Paperback / softback

Main Details

Title Coercive Distribution
Authors and Contributors      By (author) Michael Albertus
By (author) Sofia Fenner
By (author) Dan Slater
SeriesElements in the Politics of Development
Physical Properties
Format:Paperback / softback
Pages:75
Dimensions(mm): Height 230,Width 153
Category/GenreEconomic theory and philosophy
Macroeconomics
Development economics
ISBN/Barcode 9781108462136
ClassificationsDewey:339.2
Audience
Professional & Vocational
Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly
Illustrations Worked examples or Exercises

Publishing Details

Publisher Cambridge University Press
Imprint Cambridge University Press
Publication Date 25 April 2018
Publication Country United Kingdom

Description

Canonical theories of political economy struggle to explain patterns of distribution in authoritarian regimes. In this Element, Albertus, Fenner, and Slater challenge existing models and introduce an alternative, supply-side, and state-centered theory of 'coercive distribution'. Authoritarian regimes proactively deploy distributive policies as advantageous strategies to consolidate their monopoly on power. These policies contribute to authoritarian durability by undercutting rival elites and enmeshing the masses in lasting relations of coercive dependence. The authors illustrate the patterns, timing, and breadth of coercive distribution with global and Latin American quantitative evidence and with a series of historical case studies from regimes in Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East. By recognizing distribution's coercive dimensions, they account for empirical patterns of distribution that do not fit with quasi-democratic understandings of distribution as quid pro quo exchange. Under authoritarian conditions, distribution is less an alternative to coercion than one of its most effective expressions.